Asymmetric Labor Markets, Southern Wages, and the Location of Firms by Alireza Naghavi
This paper can be downloaded without charge at:
The Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Note di Lavoro Series Index:
http://www.feem.it/Feem/Pub/Publications/WPapers/default.htm
Social Science Research Network Electronic Paper Collection:
http://ssrn.com/abstract=657263
The opinions expressed in this paper do not necessarily reflect the position of
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei
Corso Magenta, 63, 20123 Milano (I), web site: www.feem.it, e-mail: working.papers@feem.it
Asymmetric Labor Markets,
Southern Wages,
and the Location of Firms
Alireza Naghavi
NOTA DI LAVORO 17.2005
JANUARY 2005
KTHC - Knowledge, Technology, Human Capital
Alireza Naghavi, University College Dublin and CERASAsymmetric Labor Markets, Southern Wages, and the Location of
Firms
Summary
This paper studies the behavior of firms towards weak labor rights in developing
countries (South). A less than perfectly elastic labor supply in the South gives firms
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1. Introduction 
The economic consequences of labor standards and the question whether WTO should have an 
active role in promoting regulatory standards in the South have been highly controversial issues 
in recent trade rounds.
1 Strong differences in opinions amongst major players have blocked 
attempts by industrialized nations (North), mainly the United States, to provide the WTO with the 
power to resolve issues dealing with labor standards. Officials from developing countries (South) 
view these efforts as nothing but attempts to take away the only competitive advantage of the 
South, namely abundant and relatively cheap labor. Although the Northern interest is claimed to 
be for humanitarian purposes, many suspect that the true motive behind it is egoistic, protectionist 
concerns. These concerns originate from a demand for ‘fair trade’ that itself originates from fears 
of an outflow of activity towards an artificially more competitive South and a subsequent loss of 
employment in Northern unskilled sectors.  
There is a vast literature on labor standards that deals with their social, philosophical and 
economic aspects. Much of the economic literature such as Brown, Deardorff and Stern (1998) 
and Srinivasan (1997) reviews the issue in a non-analytical context and discusses the 
consequences of potential social clause tariffs used by the WTO to enforce labor standards. 
Maskus (1997) looks at core labor standards using basic microeconomic principles and proposes 
several policies to eliminate each problem. The conclusion often reached is that the indirect use of 
trade policy for this purpose harms precisely the people that the policy is intended to help.
2 
                                                 
1 Discussions on labor standards often refer to the five “core” labor standards, which consist of (1) 
elimination of exploitative use of child labor, (2) prohibition of forced labor, (3) elimination of 
discrimination in employment, (4) freedom of association, and (5) provision of the right to organize and 
bargain collectively. Here, we concentrate on “economic” labor standards by contrast dealing essentially 
with issues such as minimum wages and working conditions. See Irwin (2002). 
2 In contrast, Freeman (1994) and Krueger (1996) are two of few papers that have hinted their support for 
such policy initiatives.   4
Although these papers have suggested other direct policy measures to address the issue, a 
theoretical analysis to look at the crux of the problem has been missing in the economic literature. 
This paper studies the effect of the differences that exist between the labor markets of 
industrialized and developing countries. Namely it looks at the behavior of firms when they 
compete in a world product market while facing different labor market structures. The labor 
supply curve in the North is seen as fully elastic, resulting in perfectly competitive wages, 
whereas the Southern labor supply is assumed to be upward sloping due to the presence of 
abundant labor there. This of course gives firms that operate in the South market power in the 
labor market allowing them to pay workers a wage lower than the perfectly competitive level. 
This approach at the same time takes care of facts found in recent studies that multinationals, 
which relocate their production to the South, tend to pay higher than the market (reservation) 
wages (Brown, Deardorff and Stern, 2002).
3 This can be one explanation for the lack of labor 
standards in the South, or equally, the disadvantage experienced by labor symbolized by their 
lower wages. It also highlights the importance of the relationship between wages and the decision 
of Northern multinationals regarding their output and production location. Indeed, the ever-
increasing ability of firms to carry jobs by choosing their production location has given rise to an 
                                                 
3 It has often been argued that the labor supply in developing countries is perfectly elastic at the level of 
reservation survival wages, which could lie far beneath the perfectly competitive level. This is clearly the 
case in agricultural employment and the informal sector. This paper however focuses on the formal sector 
in the South as it is the latter that is usually related to competitive advantage concerns, fears of spillovers of 
the lower wages in the South, and possible job losses in the unskilled sectors in the North caused by the 
relocation of multinationals. As the workers doing the unskilled work in firms in the South are relatively 
more skilled than those working in farms and the informal sectors, it can be assumed that they create an 
upward sloping supply curve and thereby enjoy higher than reservation wages in the South. Working in the 
formal sector is hence still seen as a novelty for residents in the South regardless of their wages being much 
lower than that of their counterparts, namely the unskilled labor in richer countries.  5
important missing link between the labor market and the location of firms.
4 While this issue has 
rarely been discussed in labor literature, it has generally been taken for granted that firms always 
wish to move to regions where wages and labor rights are inferior in order to take advantage of 
lower marginal costs.  
This paper explores this link by examining the strategic decisions of multinationals on output and 
location in response to labor policies in the South. It argues that, contrary to conventional 
wisdom, multinationals are not always attracted to regions with weak labor laws to take 
advantage of the lower labor costs. Even in the absence of social clause tariffs, potential 
monopsonistic/oligopsonistic market power in the South can actually make firms reluctant to base 
their production there. The results show that even in the absence of exogenous motives such as 
culture, politics, or stability that work against foreign investment in developing countries, the 
endogenous strategic behavior of firms can alone prevent delocation to the South. This theory 
shows one possible explanation for the paradoxical empirical findings of Rodrik (1996), which 
revealed that multinationals tend to locate more in countries where labor standards are enforced 
and hence marginal costs of labor are higher.
 5  
To be more specific, firms decide on location by simply observing the profitability of each region, 
which is in turn determined by the strategic actions of firms in an open economy. In the absence 
of labor standards, a less than perfectly elastic labor supply in the South gives firms there an 
oligopsonistic position, which enables them to set wages through their choice of output. These 
                                                 
4 Dewit, Leahy and Montagna (2003) is one of the few papers that point towards this direction. They study 
the location decision of firms with the asymmetry in the labor markets arising from the differences in 
employment protection laws in countries and therefore the flexibility with which firms can adjust output 
and employment in each region to the evolving economic conditions. 
5 This study was done on US multinationals and the receptivity of their locational decision on labor 
standards in force in host countries. Brown, Deardorff and Stern (2002) provide additional evidence to 
support the idea that the low standards are not a primary factor in investment decisions of multinationals.   6
firms at the same time compete in the product market, and in an open economy also with firms in 
the North that operate in a perfectly competitive labor market.
6 This dual market imperfection 
concept creates a link between the labor market and the product market. Firms located in the 
South tend to exploit their market power and suppress wages and employment by strategically 
reducing their output. This creates an indirect negative scale effect on profits that offsets or at 
least weakens the direct positive gains from lower wages. Firms remaining in the North can on 
the other hand free-ride on the presence of oligopsony in the South and strategically increase their 
output as they face less aggressive competitors. The combination of these effects along with the 
ex-post disadvantages of relocation to the South that arise from lower production and profits per 
firm (competition effect) could overshadow the attractiveness of lower wage in the South and 
make the North the more profitable region.   
The paper further investigates a common complaint by labor unions and others in rich countries 
about the existence of no or unacceptably low minimum wages in the South, and the enforcement 
of such legislation there. It simultaneously studies objections made by Southern authorities 
regarding the adoption of such policies, which are claimed to adversely affect the competitiveness 
and welfare of the South. A minimum wage policy, namely a marginal increase in monopsony 
wages in the South, is therefore brought into the model to look at its impact on the 
competitiveness of the South and well being of labor there.
7 It will be seen in accordance with 
Martin and Maskus (2001) that adopting labor standards can actually increase the competitiveness 
of the South when the product market (demand) is taken into account. It also looks at the 
                                                 
6 Monopsony has been a common argument used to model the lack of labor standards in the South. See for 
example Maskus (1997) and Corden and Vousden (2002). The demand side of labor emerging from a 
product market has however been left out of their analysis.  
7 As all core labor standards share the feature that workers are paid less than their value (marginal value 
product of their labor), wages can also be used as an indicator of the enforcement of standards in the region. 
Lim (2001) shows that higher wages are usually correlated with better labor standards.   7
implications of such policies on Southern welfare and shows that the South unambiguously gains 
from adopting a minimum wage law both on grounds of competitiveness in the product market 
and through a higher consumer and wage surplus experienced by its citizens. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the model and presents the 
asymmetry in the structure of the labor markets. The effects of lower wages in the South on 
output and the location of firms are then brought into the model in section 3. Section 4 looks at 
the competitiveness and the welfare effects of introducing a fixed minimum wage above the 
distorted market wages in the South. Section 5 concludes. 
2. The Model: Asymmetric Labor Markets  
There are two countries: the North and the South. The difference between the two regions lies in 
the toughness of competition in their labor market. The North is assumed to have a perfectly 
elastic labor supply, while abundant labor in the South causes a less than infinitely elastic labor 
supply giving firms exploitative market power. There are N firms in the world market of which n 
firms are located in the North and N-n in the South. Firms are fully mobile and can locate in 
either region. A single factor of production, labor, is used to produce the good. Workers are paid 
the market wage wi, which is also the marginal cost of production. On the product side of the 
market, firms produce a homogeneous good for an integrated world market and compete in an 
open economy à la Cournot. Markets are assumed to be segmented with firms optimizing for their 
domestic and export markets independently. They incur unit trade costs τ on their exports to the 
other region. The game consists of two stages: firms decide on plant location in the first stage and 
engage in production in the second stage.  
Demand takes the familiar linear form 
S N i for y a p i i , = − = ,                        (1) 
where a represents the market size and is assumed to be identical for both regions and subscripts 
N and S stand for the North and the South. y indicates total production for each region and is  8
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where q is the quantity produced and the bar indicates production by all other firms. The first 
subscript shows where the good is produced, while the second refers to the market it is intended 
for. The paper initially looks at a duopoly case in order to fully capture and display the effects of 
the labor market structure on the behavior of firms regarding their choices on output and 
location.
8 The rest of the main text refers to the two established firms: a Northern multinational, 
which chooses location, and a local Southern firm.
9 
The profit functions for the Northern and the Southern firm are respectively 
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where wi is the wage paid to workers in each region.
10 Due to a fully elastic labor supply curve in 
the North, firms treat wages as exogenous and pay workers their marginal value product.
11 While 
the Northern labor market behaves competitively, the upward sloping supply curve in the South 
creates a monopsony/oligopsony form of market imperfection.
12 In other words, a firm in the 
South takes the labor supply into consideration when choosing output. It limits production as 
                                                 
8 The model is shown in its full form with N firms in appendix II.  
9 The model is fully robust with respect to the identity of firms. The locational outcome as well as the 
welfare results remain unchanged for instance when both firms are footloose Northern multinationals. 
10 Unit trade cost t is normalized by the market size and is represented by τ so that τ=t/(a-w). This allows us 
to set a-w (or a-wN , when appropriate) to unity and eliminate it from all the upcoming equations.  
11 It is assumed throughout this paper that labor standards are always perfectly enforced in the North.  
12 Under the typical monopsony argument, the firm is the single employer and gains from infra-marginal 
reductions in wages for all workers whenever it cuts hiring. This generates a marginal cost curve for labor 
that lies above the labor supply curve. The firm maximizes profit by setting employment where the 
marginal cost of labor equals its marginal revenue product, causing a markup of marginal cost over wages.  9
more output means higher employment, which in turn increases wages due to the upward sloping 
labor supply curve. This results in wages lower than their competitive level. In an open economy, 
a monopsonist competing in the product market drives a wedge between foreign and domestic 
wages by limiting employment in its local labor market, even at fixed product prices. When there 
is more than one firm in the South, an oligopsony situation occurs as firms compete for labor with 
other local firms. Firms however retain some market power due to the less than perfectly elastic 
labor supply and still exploit workers by paying them a wage below their marginal value.
13  
Southern wage or the inverse labor supply function can be written as  
[] S S S N Q Q w w − = − * β ,                                  (4) 
where QS* and QS are the quantity produced in the South under perfect competition and distortion  
respectively.
14 β is the slope of the supply curve (inverse elasticity of supply). Note that the fact 
that output appears in the wage function of firms in the South creates a link between wages and 
output. Asymmetry between the two regions arises because moving to the South would 
internalize this wage function in the profit maximization problem of a firm. A higher quantity 
produced by a firm in the South decreases its profit margin in the South by increasing wages. 
Total profits however also depend on the firm’s total production shown by qSN and qSS outside the 
parentheses in (3). Much of the previous literature on labor standards such as Maskus (1997) have 
used a constant elasticity of substitution form of labor supply function, namely wS=w/(1+1/η) 
where 1/η represents the inverse elasticity/slope of the labor supply curve, to show an imperfect 
labor market in the South. Their analysis is limited to labor supply curves with a maximum slope 
of 1, as η>1 must hold to satisfy the second order condition of monopsony profits. The wage 
function in this paper is modelled in a linear manner and there are no restrictions on the slope of 
the labor supply curve (β ) as the second order condition ∂
2πS/∂qS
2=-2(1+β) is negative for all 
                                                 
13 See Bashkar, Manning and To (2002) for a thorough description of oligopsonistic labor markets. 
14 The term perfect competition here only refers to the labor market.  10
values of β. A labor supply function of this form gives a vertical intercept of wN -βQS*. Figure 1 
represents the Southern labor market. It can be seen that a lower elasticity of labor supply entails 
lower wages and production. 
To first derive competitive output QS*, we look at a case in which the labor market in the South is 
perfectly competitive.
 This creates a symmetric case, where firms in both regions are wage-takers, 
leaving no strategic relationship between output and wages. Wages in the two regions would 
hence be equal. Total quantity produced in the South would be 
3





QS                             (5) 
and the equilibrium distribution of firms across the two regions  
n*=N/2                                (6) 
in presence of the smallest form of trade or transport costs τ.
15  
3. Decisions of Firms 
3.1. Production 
In the second stage, firms compete in quantity in an open economy. If the Northern firm remains 
at home, profit maximizing output of the Northern and the Southern firm for each region is  
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15 As the derivations for this case are trivial, details have been reduced to appendix I.    11
Southern firm is the sole producer in the South, total production in this case is QS=qSS+qSN. Using 
(7) to substitute for QS  in (4), the Southern wage becomes 
) 8 3 ( 3
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Alternatively, if the Northern firm moves production to the South, quantity produced by both 
firms becomes  
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where superscript D denotes delocation. Should the Northern multinational decide to delocate to 
the South, total production in the South QS turns to 2(qSS
D+qSN
D). Replacing for QS in (4) from 
(7’), the oligopsony wage after delocation becomes 
) 2 1 ( 9
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By differentiating the optimal quantities of a Southern firm in (7) and (7’) with respect to β, we 











 in both scenarios, we can conclude that the quantity produced by a firm 
located in the South is lower the more inelastic is the labor supply curve (higher β). Cutting 
output by one unit reduces wages by more when labor supply is more responsive to wages. This 
gives a bigger market power to firms in the South inducing them to further reduce wages by 
cutting production and employment. When the monopsonist in the South competes in the product 
market with a firm located in the North, a strategic environment is created and the latter responds 
to the practice of market power by the monopsonist. The multinational operating in the North as a 
result moves up its reaction curve and expands production because it faces a less aggressive  12










 show that output by a firm in the North is always 
increasing in β.
16 The number of firms in each region is the other factor that influences firms’ 
output and plays a key role on profits. As the multinational moves into the South, quantity 
produced by each firm falls also due to the competition effect.   
The rest of the paper abstracts from trade costs in order to clearly highlight the effects of the 
difference in the labor markets of the two regions and enhance the tractibility of the model. Figure 
2 shows the output level for each locational scenario. It is easy to see that the output of the 
multinational is always higher if it stays at home than when it relocates to the South. Tariffs in 
this case simply decrease exports and increase domestic production in both regions without a bias. 
3.2. Location 
Firms decide on production location in the first stage of the game. If the South offers higher 
profits than the North, the Northern firm delocates to the more profitable region. Substituting the 
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while the profits of each firm if they both operate in the South are 
                                                 
16 It is interesting to note that the essence of the results remain the same if the model is extended to a 
Bertrand environment with differentiated products. The Southern monopsonist reduces wages and is able to 
charge a lower price. The Northern firm also lowers its price as a response but to a lesser degree. This has 
the similar effect as the Cournot case above of making delocation less attractive due to the lower prices 
charged in the South.    13
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Equation (8) clearly shows that profits of locating in the North are higher when there is a labor 
market distortion in the South and to a higher degree the more inelastic is Southern labor supply 
(higher β). This is due to the strategic increase in output that stems from the lower output in the 
South. On the other hand, equations (9) and (9’) show that β can make profits of locating in the 
South go either way. In the absence of labor standards, a higher β brings about two effects: there 
is a direct positive effect on profits as a higher β leads to lower wages and the latter entails higher 
marginal profits. There is also an indirect strategic effect as firms produce less to cause these 
lower wages. This has a negative effect on total profits as the firm lowers its scale of production. 
Whether Southern profits increase or decrease with monopsony/oligopsony depends on which of 
these two effects dominate. The number of firms in the South is also important as it influences the 
magnitude of the scale effect. When there are more firms in the South, production per firm is 
lower not only due to oligopsony, but also because of the competition effect. This magnifies the 
effect of reduced quantity on profits, making the loss more likely to outweigh the gains from 
lower wages. The combination of these effects and increased profits in the North from higher 
output determines whether lack of labor standards in the South raises or lowers its profitability.  
The optimal profits of each firm can be found for both scenarios by replacing the appropriate 
optimal quantities back into the profit function. Figure 3 shows the profits earned from each 
region for all locational scenarios. Profit of a firm located in the North is always increasing in β 
because of increased production. For a firm located in the South on the other hand, profits 
decrease with β as a result of lower output up to a critical value of β and start rising thereafter. 
After this level of β the direct gain of locating in the South from lower wages dominates the  14
indirect loss from the strategic reduction in output.
17 The β where profits of a firm in the South is 
at its minimum increases as firms move to the South indicating that the scale effect dominates for 
a larger range of β with more firms in the South. This happens as the competition effect reduces 
output, increasing the net cutback in quantity brought about by a firm’s monopsony power.  
In summary, a monopsonist in the South must compete in the product market with firms operating 
in a perfectly competitive Northern labor market when the economy is opened to the world 
market. This gives rise to the importance of strategic changes in output when calculating the 
profitability of each region. The direct gain in marginal profits from lower wages and the indirect 
loss in total profits due to a strategic cut in the scale of production determine whether or not 
profitability of locating in the South increases with weaker labor rights. The combination of these 
two effects along with the strategic increase in output of a firm located in the North as a reaction 
towards a less aggressive competitor determines which region is more profitable as a base for 
production.  
3.3. Equilibrium Outcome 
Looking at the problem from a game theoretic perspective, figure 3 can be divided into four 
regions. It can easily be seen that delocation to the South is always dominated by other outcomes 
in areas I, II and III. In area I, a firm unconditionally earns higher profits by locating in the North 
as the effect of lower production in the South from the oligopsony effect always dominates. This 
would also give the Southern firm incentives to locate in the North if it were mobile as its profits 
                                                 
17 Note that these traits indicate a normal case where the term in brackets in (4) is positive so that a higher β 
signifies lower wages. With a low enough β and a high number of firms in the South (β<3/2 in the duopoly 
case), total quantity produced in the South is higher than its level under a perfectly competitive labor 
market making the term in the brackets negative. This gives the awkward result that wages in the South are 
higher than competitive wages prevailing in the North. This situation is not an area of interest and is 
ignored in the analysis, as it is in any case never an equilibrium outcome.   15
after moving would still be higher than what it would earn in the South. The profitability of 
locating in the North is unconditionally higher when profits of a firm in the symmetric case are 
higher than the profits of the Southern firm with one firm in each country. The critical value of β 
up to which this occurs is  4 / 3 = β . 
In areas II and III both firms have higher profits if they locate in separate regions. Profits of 
locating in the North are higher than that of the South up to  2 / 3
~
= β  where the profitability of 
the two regions with one firm in each is equal.  β β β
~
< <  represents area II where the free-riding 
effect dominates so that the strategic increase in output by a firm in the North increases the 
relative profitability of locating there. The Northern firm thus decides to forgo the market power 
it could acquire by relocating.  
In area III where  β β β ′ ′ < <
~
, the multinational is tempted to move to the South to take 
advantage of the negligible wages there as the Southern firm makes higher profits. However, the 
competition effect plays the dominant role in this area as if it relocates to the South, output and 
hence profits of all firms in the South fall below what the firm could earn by staying in the North. 
Thus in this area lower wages are attractive, but not sufficient to induce the Northern firm to 
move production. 
When  β reaches high levels, its direct linear effect on wages gains more significance as its 
marginal effect on quantity gradually diminishes. For a quasi-vertical Southern labor supply curve 
in area IV (very high values of  β β ′ ′ > ) the Northern firm moves to the South as the ex-post 
profits of relocating to the South is higher than profits of staying in the North.  
Note that for a significant range of slopes of the labor supply curve considered in previous 
literature (β <1), the locational equilibrium would be agglomeration in the North when mobility 
of the Southern firm is allowed for. Although the analysis for the South in this paper is extended 
to consider highly inelastic labor supply curves, very high values of β are of small significance.  16
Smaller values of β are of greater interest as impact of limited standards on Southern wages are 
likely to be small in the context of a quasi-elastic labor pool near reservation wages (Maskus, 
1997). It is also worth noting that this represents the worst-case scenario, namely the situation 
where delocation is most likely to occur. While adding tariffs leaves  β and  β
~
 unchanged, it 





. This indicates that a higher tariff reinforces the results by pushing back 
delocation to the South and making it unattractive for an even larger range of β .
18 
We can conclude that the negative strategic scale effect of oligopsony on profits weakens the 
profitability of lower wages in the South. Therefore, the North can, regardless of the higher 
marginal costs associated with it, be more attractive or at least as attractive as the South for a 
significant range of β with the help of its strategic increase in output and the competition effect. 
In fact, the analysis shows that for a large range of β lack of labor standards does not attract 
multinationals to the South and may even drive them away. This is contrary to conventional 
wisdom which believes that weak labor standards will always lead to social dumping in 
developing countries. The strategic behavior of firms and the resulting outcome in quantity 
produced can be an explanation why multinationals forgo lower wages and tend to locate in the 
North, where labor standards are fully implemented. This also takes away any justification for 
worries by the North over loss of jobs due to transfer of activity to the South. We saw that firms 
in the North not only hesitate to relocate to the South, but even increase domestic activity, i.e. 
production, as a strategic reaction towards lower Southern output.  
Proposition 1 
Lack of labor rights in the South unconditionally makes the North the more attractive region for 
β β < < 0 where the ‘oligopsony effect’ dominates in profits. Lower wages in the South are also 
                                                 
18 A unilateral social clause tariffs can also be applied here, but it would lower the profitability of the South 
to an even greater extent and further discourage delocation.  17
not sufficient to make Northern firms relocate to the South for a large range of β when  β β ≥ . 
The monopsony situation in the South induces Northern firms to remain in the North to ‘free-ride’ 
on the existence of less aggressive competitors in the South up to β
~
. Even after β
~
, where lower 
wages make the South more profitable than the North, a Northern firm is better off by operating 
at home to avoid the ‘competition effect’ it would create by relocating to the South. Only for very 
high values of  β β ′ ′ > , where wages approach zero, does the lower marginal cost (quasi-free 
production) in the South become a significant attraction for multinationals. 
4. Minimum Wage, Southern Competitiveness and Welfare  
After proving that lower wages in the South do not necessarily attract more multinationals to the 
region, it is essential to find out if a minimum wage policy in the South actually helps improve 
Southern standards of living. Means of implementing standards in the South can take several 
forms, but they all point towards higher marginal costs of production in the South. This could be 
interpreted as partially taking away the market power of multinationals that exploit workers in the 
South by reducing output and wages. Therefore, this section looks at an exogenous marginal 
increase in wages in the South towards of the competitive level as means of reducing the 
monopsony power of firms operating there.
19 Recalling the location results that the Northern firm 
does not move to the South unless the labor supply curve in the South is highly inelastic shows 
that relocated multinationals are not the only firms affected by higher wages. When the South 
upgrades its standards, local Southern firms are also forced to abide by the new set of standards in 
force. This creates concerns that the South may lose in terms of welfare as local firms could 
undergo huge, maybe unrecoverable, losses when forced to increase wages.  
                                                 
19 This rules out the introduction of unions as a means of introducing labor standards unless they are 
specifically designed to increase wages without limiting employment.  18
Once again concentrating on the case of free trade, a minimum wage can be introduced as a small 
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≤  must be satisfied to assure that wages in the South do not surpass those in the 
North.
21 Firms change their level of output accordingly with this increase in wages and maximize 
profits using the constant wS
min instead of the wage function wS(QS). The wage used hence no 
longer contains the quantity produced by the firm, depriving the latter from its monopsony power. 
In figure 1, the monopsonist moves up the labor supply curve and increases output up to the point 
where the latter meets the minimum wage. The quantity produced by each firm after the 
implementation of the policy becomes 
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where i=N,S. It can easily be seen that a minimum wage policy reverses the sign of the changes in 














. Keeping ε constant, a more inelastic 
labor supply still means a lower wage in the South prior to the policy.
22 Yet, as wages are no 
longer dependent on output, a lower wage does not entail an oligopsony effect and is nothing but 
a marginal cost advantage over the Northern firm. The more inelastic the labor supply, the higher 
is this cost advantage and in turn Southern production. In a Cournot environment, the Northern 
                                                 
20 ε is an increment in wages normalized by the market size (a-w) as with τ for the simplicity of notation. 
21 In other words, a higher increment is allowed for when labor supply is less elastic (wages are lower). 
22 Changes in ε are irrelevant in this paper as we are interested in introducing a minimum wage policy as a 
one-time change in the labor market structure as opposed to analyzing changes in the minimum wage.  19
firm now reacts to a more aggressive competitor and reduces output accordingly. Adjusted 
quantities for both firms are shown by the dotted line in figure 2. Profits of each firm also change 
accordingly and are found by substituting quantities produced from (11) into (3): 
2
2 2
2 min 2 min min
) 8 3 ( 81
] 8 ) 8 3 )( 1 ( 3 [ 2






= + = NS NN N q q ,                (12) 
2
2 2
2 min 2 min min
) 8 3 ( 81
] 16 ) 8 3 )( 2 1 ( 3 [ 2






= + = SS SN S q q .              (13) 
The effect of minimum wages on profits is identical to that on output with β drastically increasing 
the profits in the South while decreasing that in the North. Profits after the introduction of 
minimum wages are shown by the dotted line in figure 3. Note that the Northern firm is driven 
out of the market when the South has a very high wage advantage of 






+ + + + ≥ ε ε ε β . It can therefore be concluded that minimum wages actually 
increase the competitiveness of the South by eliminating on one side the negative oligopsony 
effect on output and profits in the South, and on the other side the free-riding opportunity of firms 
located in the North.  
If the initial situation is oligopsony (β>β’’), effects of a minimum wage policy are similar to 
those explained above as the desire to reduce output with a higher β disappears. Recall however 
that the minimum wage should be higher in the oligopsony case as Southern wages are already 
higher due to a lower concentration of firms. The increment in this case is added to (4’’) instead 
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The increment ε must satisfy the condition 
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ε  for the wage to remain lower than 
that in the North. The quantity produced by both firms and their profits become  20
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where i=N,S. Output and profits are increasing in β for both firms equally. The change in output 
and profits are also illustrated for this case in figures 2 and 3. Notice that due to the oligopsony 
situation here, the positive effect of a minimum wage on output is less significant than when there 
is one firm in the South. This is because rival employers must also increase their wages to respect 
the new minimum wages and increase output.
23  
Turning our attention now to total Southern welfare, we must also take into account the impact of 
the policy on consumer and worker surplus in the South. Note that the latter is the triangle under 













WS where CS WS W
+
= = + + =
β
π ,                             (14) 









min min min min S N
S
S S














min representing the total output for each region. The same concept applies for 
the delocation case using the corresponding values for profits and total output.
24 
                                                 
23 Bashkar and Toe (2002) demonstrates the impact of minimum wages in an oligopsonistic model in detail.  
It explains that due to the presence of multiple employers, a minimum wage also shifts the supply and with 
it the marginal cost curve to the left as the supply curve faced by a firm also depends on rival wage rates. 
As all employers must increase wages, labor market competition increases. They conclude that a minimum 
wage moderately set above the market wage still increases employment through greater labor participation. 
24 As the impact of a minimum wage with delocation is similar to that for FDI, this case will not be 
discussed any further.  21
The welfare effects of implementing a minimum wage policy can immediately be seen as 
πS
min>πS, QS
min>QS and ε>0 from the above discussion and QN
min+QS
min> QN +QS from (7) and 
(11). The inequalities imply that along with the increased competitiveness of the South, wage 
surplus increases due to higher wages and employment, and consumer surplus increases due to a 
higher output. As a result a minimum wage policy unambiguously enhances Southern welfare. 
The results are fully robust for all non-negative, feasible values of trade costs.
25  
These findings suggest that improving labor standards can raise welfare in the South. It increases 
output and with it employment, raises wages and can even make the South a more attractive 
region for production than when the authorities in the South turn their back on labor standards. 
The results can give grounds in favor of taking international action for enforcing policies that aim 
at increasing economic labor standards in the South. In fact, the desired outcomes are shown to be 
achievable even through an often skeptically perceived minimum wage policy. 
Proposition 2  
Introducing a minimum wage policy in the South boosts output, profits, and hence the 
competitiveness of firms in the South. It eliminates the oligopsony and the free-riding effect in the 
South and the North respectively. The more inelastic is Southern labor supply, the greater is the 
marginal cost advantage. Wage surplus and consumer surplus also increase due to a rise in 
wages, output and hence employment towards their competitive level. Thus adopting a minimum 
wage policy improves Southern welfare unambiguously. 
5. Conclusion  
This paper builds a simple model to study the relationship between regional differences in labor 
markets and the location of firms. Specifically, it explains the strategic behavior of firms towards 
the lack of labor rights in the South when firms compete in an open economy with asymmetric 
labor markets. The framework shows the linkage between the product and the labor market 
                                                 
25 Calculations are available from the author upon request.  22
caused by the market imperfection in the South and highlights the importance of this link in 
firms’ decisions on output and location. It attempts to answer commonly asked questions about 
labor standards and the action of multinationals such as: Do firms react to low labor standards in 
the South and relocate to produce with lower labor costs (social dumping) as claimed in 
industrialized countries? Does the South lose in terms of competitiveness and welfare by adopting 
tougher labor standards as claimed by developing countries?  
Due to the capacity of firms to influence wages through their choices of location and output, both 
decisions turn strategic towards the labor market. A strategic cut in production subsequent to the 
potential market power a firm can gain by moving to the South makes the latter a less attractive 
region to locate production. Meanwhile, the North becomes even more profitable as firms located 
there free-ride on the presence of less aggressive oligopsonists in the South by increasing their 
production. Total production and therefore profits per firm also fall after delocation as a result of 
the competition effect that emerges from having one more firm in the South. These effects induce 
firms to remain in the North and can even at times tempt a Southern firm to leave the South 
regardless of the lower wages there. The new paradoxical results build a theoretical background 
for the empirical suggestion that multinationals do not necessarily choose production location on 
a basis of weaker labor standards. Present fears in the North of losing jobs to a more competitive 
South are thus not legitimate as a weaker labor standard regime in the South increases production 
and profits in the North and induces firms to stay in the North. 
The paper also delivers a policy message by demonstrating that a minimum wage policy as means 
of improving labor standards in the South can make the latter better off in every aspect. It shows 
that a small increment in the Southern wage eliminates the monopsony/oligopsony market 
distortion, drastically increasing production and with it the competitiveness of the South in the 
world market. Higher wages, output and employment at the same time raise both wage and 
consumer surplus in the South resulting in an unambiguous improvement in Southern welfare. 
This gives a hint of justification for those who see such efforts as a humane act. More detailed  23
work remains to be done on the issue to include the impact of social clause tariffs and the efficacy 
of threats to apply them in case of non-compliance. As this paper showed that the South always 
benefits from adopting labor standards anyway, such punishments would be deemed unnecessary 
and inefficient to bring about a change if governments were to act rationally. Yet if substantiating 
these benefits does not prove useful in convincing the representatives of the South, leaving the 
job to a trade-related organization with the power of enforcement such as the WTO may be the 
only credible solution to assure long-term prosperity and growth in the poorer regions of the 
world.    24
Appendix I: The Perfectly Competitive Labor Market Case 
Profits per firm in each country are 
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Note that w is the competitive wage that here applies to both regions. Firms take production by all 
other firms as given and maximize profits by solving for their optimal output for each region. 
Optimal quantities by each firm in the case of perfectly competitive labor markets assuming 
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where the star denotes harmonized labor standards. Replacing optimal quantities back into firms’ 
profit functions and setting profits from locating in the North and the South equal, the equilibrium 
distribution of firms can be found:  
2 / * N n =                          (A.3) 
In the presence of the smallest form of trade/transport costs, firms prefer to locate close to their 
consumers. The only possible equilibrium with equal market sizes is when half the total number 
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for the North and the South respectively. Profitability of the two regions is equal and can be seen 
in figure 3 as the horizontal line.   25
Appendix II: Location of Firms in a Multi-Firm Case 
This appendix extends the model to a multi-firm case to show the dynamics of multinationals’ 
movements as a result of asymmetric labor markets in a more general setting. With N firms in the 
world market, total production in the South equals         
SS SS SN SN S q n N q q n N q Q ) 1 ( ) 1 ( − − + + − − + =                 (A.5) 
where the bar above quantity produced indicates production by all other firms. 
Recall from section 2 that the number of firms in each region with symmetric labor markets (QS*) 
is N/2. With asymmetric labor markets, the inverse labor supply function in the South is (A.2) in 
text where with many firms (A.5) is used as the total production in the South. I look at the case 
where trade costs are approaching zero as adding the latter does not change the nature of the 
results. 
The profit maximizing quantity produced by each of the n firms in the North and the N-n in the 
South are respectively 
] 3 2 ) ( 3 1 )[ 1 (
) 1 ( 1
) , ( ) , (
] 3 2 ) ( 3 1 )[ 1 (
4 3 ) ( 2 1
) , ( ) , (
β β β β
β
β β β β
β β β β
+ + − − + + +
+ + +
= =
+ + − − + + +
+ + − − + +
= =
N n n N N N N
n N N
N n q N n q
N n n N N N N
N n n N N N
N n q N n q
SS SN
NS NN
          (A.6) 
When a multinational that initially resides in the North has to make its decision on location, it 
must compare the profits of not moving to the ex-post profits that will prevail after it relocates to 
the South. After a Northern firm moves to the South, n-1 firms remain in the North while the 
number of firms in the South increases to N-n+1. The ex-post optimal quantity that will be 
produced by firms in each region after the move becomes 
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Using the optimal quantities from (A.6) in (A.1), optimal profits of remaining in the North can be 
found:  26
2 2 ) , ( ) , ( ) , ( N n q N n q N n NS NN N + = π                     (A.8) 
The profits of the same firm if it moves to the South would become 
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where (A.7) is used to substitute for the optimal quantity produced by each firm in (A.1). Figure 4 
simulates these profits for N=10 and calculates the threshold β for all possible initial values of n 
where the profitability of the two regions is equal. The multinational keeps production in the 
North if β is below this level and chooses to relocate otherwise. This value of β is equivalent to 
the intersection of the two curves πN and πS
D in figure 3 for the duopoly case. It is decreasing in n 
signifying that when there are more firms in the South, a higher value of β is required for a firm 
to move to the South to take advantage of lower wages. This occurs as the competition effect 
brought about by having an extra firm in the South leads to lower production and less profits per 
firm. The competition effect in turn reinforces the scale effect and causes the oligopsony effect 
and the subsequent strategic reaction of the Northern firms to outweigh the effects of lower wages 
on profits for a larger range of β. Therefore, delocation becomes less likely as the flow of 
Northern firms to the South continues with the equilibrium number of firm in each region 
determined by the prevailing elasticity of labor supply in the South. In summary, as oligopsony 
power is strongest when the concentration of firms is highest, a lower number of firms in the 
South strengthens the oligopsony effect, increasing the potential gains attained from delocation. 
At the same time, a higher number of firms in the North makes delocation more attractive by 
creating a competition effect in the North and diminishing the free riding effect that is shared by 
all Northern firms. It can also be seen that a higher number of firms in the world market weakens 
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